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Sigmund Freud (1856 – 1939) was born into a Jewish family in Frieberg, which was, at 
the time, a part of the Austrian Empire. He was the father of psychoanalysis, greatly 
influenced the development of psychology, and continues to serve as a landmark figure 
within many disciplines across the humanities (including literary theory, continental 
philosophy, and religious studies). 
He rose to prominence during a period in European history which enjoyed 
enormous optimism regarding the ability of science to usher in broad social progress—
leading to a broadening of what topics might fall within the purview of the natural 
sciences. Starting with the scientific revolution of the 16th century, the natural sciences 
had experienced unparalleled progress, which led to unprecedented advancements in 
medicine, astronomy, physics, biology, and much more. Religious debates, in contrast, 
had (by the 19th century) suffered from a stark lack of obvious progress; indeed, 
following some lines of thought that originated in the enlightenment, religion was often 
seen as the source of intellectual stagnation, dogmatism, brutal divisions, and violence. 
And it is within this context that we can see Freud’s naturalistic understanding—and 
corresponding critique—of religious belief emerging. 
While Freud’s understanding of religion evolved over the course of his career—
starting with Totem and Taboo (1913) and progressing through The Future of an Illusion 
(1927), Civilization and its Discontents (1930), and Moses and Monotheism (1939)— his 
 2 
central idea was that many religious beliefs and practices yield naturalistic explanations 
in terms of being the product of neuroses. In other words, Freud’s critique of religion 
ultimately rests on an account of the cognitive genesis of religious beliefs. If the 
cognitive mechanisms that lead people to form the target religious beliefs are suspect, 
then perhaps that gives us a reason to doubt the veracity of the target belief. For 
example, if I know that my belief that “I am in mortal danger” is the product of an 
anxiety disorder and not the product of rational deliberation, then I have a reason to 
doubt the veracity of my belief that I am indeed in mortal danger, because beliefs 
formed as a direct result of an anxiety disorder are often radically distorted and 
notoriously unreliable. Perhaps something similar is happening with religious beliefs. 
Freud’s most enduring critique of religion comes from his understanding of 
religious belief as being the product of what he calls “wish-fulfillment.” As Freud 
explained in The Future of an Illusion (1927): 
These [religious beliefs], which are given out as teachings, are not precipitates of 
experience or end-results of thinking: they are illusions, fulfillments of the oldest, 
strongest and most urgent wishes of mankind. The secret of their strength lies in 
the strength of those wishes. As we already know, the terrifying impressions of 
helplessness in childhood aroused the need for protection—for protection 
through love—which was provided by the father; and the recognition that this 
helplessness lasts throughout life made it necessary to cling to the existence of a 
father, but this time a more powerful one. Thus the benevolent rule of a divine 
Providence allays our fear of the dangers of life; the establishment of a moral 
world-order ensures the fulfillment of the demands of justice, which have so 
often remained unfulfilled in human civilization; and the prolongation of earthly 
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existence in a future life provides the local and temporal framework in which 
these wish-fulfillments shall take place. (Freud 1953-1974, vol. xxi, 30) 
 
Importantly, describing religious beliefs in terms of wish-fulfillment does not entail that 
religious beliefs are, for that reason, false. (After all, perhaps God placed within us a 
sense of helplessness and a need for protection, as a way to draw us to himself.) Even if 
we can explain why a person believes some proposition, it does not follow that that 
person’s belief is false (that’d be to commit the genetic fallacy). One may believe a 
proposition as the result of an illusion, even when the proposition happens to be true. 
That said, Freud is far from sanguine on this score. Freud, being a proverbial 
“master of suspicion” and an ardent atheist, later went on to describe religious belief 
not as an illusion (which, for Freud, is not necessarily at odds with reality) but as a 
delusion. In Civilization and its Discontents (1930), Freud explains: “A special importance 
attaches to the case in which [the] attempt to procure a certainty of happiness and a 
protection against suffering through a delusional remolding of reality is made by a 
considerable number of people in common. The religions of mankind must be classed 
among the mass-delusions of this kind” (Freud 1953-1974, vol. xxi, 81). 
Regardless, Freud seeks to provide reasons for questioning whether relig ious 
beliefs are justified, warranted, or rational, given their cognitive genesis. Or, drawing 
from Alvin Plantinga’s helpful description, Freud’s critique of religion does not amount 
to a de facto critique of religion (that is, regarding its truth or falsity—though Freud 
clearly thinks that religious beliefs are indeed false)—but, instead, it amounts to a de 
jure critique of religion, that is, concerning its epistemic status, justification, warrant, 
rationality, etc. (2000, 136-40).  
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 Freud’s critique of religion, supposing it to be the product of an unreliable 
cognitive mechanism (like wish-fulfillment), has been enormously influential, and 
aspects of Freud’s critique of religion are often used to frame (and dismiss) religious 
belief and practice within contemporary debates—especially at a “popular” level of 
scholarship. Consider, for example, the sentiment expressed by Sam Harris in his book, 
The End of Faith (2005):  
We have names for people who have many beliefs for which there is no rational 
justification. When their beliefs are extremely common we call them "religious"; 
otherwise, they are likely to be called "mad," "psychotic," or "delusional.”. . . To 
be ruled by ideas for which you have no evidence (and which therefore cannot 
be justified in conversation with other human beings) is generally a sign that 
something is seriously wrong with your mind. Clearly, there is sanity in 
numbers. And yet, it is merely an accident of history that it is considered normal 
in our society to believe that the Creator of the universe can hear your thoughts, 
while it is demonstrative of mental illness to believe that he is communicating 
with you by having the rain tap in Morse code on your bedroom window. 
(Harris 2005, 72) 
Lines of thought that originate from Freud’s critique can also be found, for example, in 
the common dismissal of religious belief as an “intellectual crutch.”  
 Famously, Sir Karl Popper argued in his book Conjectures and Refutations (1963) 
that Freud’s work in psychoanalysis should not be considered science, since it does not 
make claims that are falsifiable. According to Popper, Freud’s psychoanalysis is 
pseudoscience. Popper’s account of psychoanalysis proved to be deeply influential, and 
insofar as we have reason to doubt the scientific legitimacy of Freud’s psychoanalytic 
theory we also have reason to doubt the scientific legitimacy of Freud’s critique of 
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religion as a product of neuroses, understood from a psychoanalytic framework. As 
such, criticisms of Freud’s critique of religious belief have centered chiefly on the lack of 
any empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that religious beliefs really are 
generally a product of wish-fulfilment or neuroses. To be sure, this is not to say that 
some people will not believe in God as a result of wish-fulfillment—that might 
sometimes be the case—however, empirical research has found that this is not the case 
for religious belief in general. As it happens, the emerging science of religious belief is 
not as grim as Freud suggested. Cognitive science of religion and related evolutionary 
approaches have begun to converge on the idea that humans are naturally disposed to 
believe in gods, among other religious ideas. This research has found that people do not 
need unusual abilities, experiences, or pathology to find themselves drawn to religious 
beliefs. Indeed, today it is the widespread view of cognitive science of religion scholars 
that the faculties that incline humans toward religious beliefs are part of the general 
conceptual toolkit for negotiating life as a human (see, for example, Barrett 2004).  
 One of the most enduring features of Freud’s critique, however, is that it 
highlights that religious beliefs and practices can and should indeed be empirically 
studied. And if it could be shown that religious beliefs were indeed the product of a 
cognitive malfunction or a cognitive faculty that is notoriously unreliable, then that 
would theoretically provide a serious de jure critique of religion. In this way, then, 
scholars working within contemporary cognitive science of religion or the psychology 
of religious belief can point to Freud as one who powerfully highlighted the need for 
this kind of research at the intersections of religion, psychology, and cognitive science.  
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